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Summary 
Several decades after the initiation of international climate change 
negotiations, the world still struggles with the issue of how to mobilize 
climate action. In the meantime, the costs of inaction rise to unprecedented 
heights. It has proven more than difficult – even impossible for the 
international society to agree upon a binding common framework, and also 
on regional and local levels are regulatory measures, as well as persuasive 
voluntary measures conspicuous by their absence.  
 Simultaneous to this incapacity or unwillingness to act, courts around 
the world are receiving an increasing amount of climate-related claims on 
their tables. Public as well as private parties are testing different legal 
instruments to gain their cause, whether this is to encourage, or to block 
climate change regulations.  
 The European Court of Justice handed down its judgment in the 
controversial, highly debated Air Transport Association of America case, 
where a number of airlines challenged the validity of the EU scheme 
imposing emission allowances on the aviation industry. This case raised 
fundamental questions concerning the ability of the EU, a regional decision-
maker, to take unilateral action with impacts reaching far beyond the 
external borders of the Union.  
 The US Supreme Court has ruled on two closely interlinked cases – 
that of Massachusetts and AEP, where the applicants sought to mobilize 
climate change action on a national level. 
 This thesis investigates the role of the high Courts in legitimizing and 
promoting climate change action. The comparison will highlight how the 
Courts have identified and legitimized specific actors, but also analyze how 
similarities and dissimilarities in the separate legal systems will impact on 
the role of the judiciary in the climate change context. It will focus on some 
specific barriers to judicial review brought to the fore in the cases – 
primarily displacement and issues of non-justiciable political question – as 
these issues are closely related to the question of the courts’ role in climate 
change action. 
 By legitimizing and encouraging some type of action, the Courts may 
serve to break the longstanding political deadlock on climate change. 
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Sammanfattning 
Årtionden efter att internationella klimatförhandlingar inleddes tampas 
världen fortfarande med den grundläggande frågeställningen hur 
klimatåtgärder skall mobiliseras. Samtidigt stiger kostnaderna till följd av 
vår passivitet. Det har visat sig nästintill omöjligt för det internationella 
samfundet att göra upp om ett gemensamt, bindande regelverk för 
klimatpåverkan. Även på regional och lokal nivå lyser både bindande 
regleringar och effektiva marknadsåtgärder med sin frånvaro. 
 Parallellt med denna oförmåga, eller ovilja att vidta åtgärder, utgör 
domstolar runt om i världen spelrum för allt fler klimatrelaterade tvister. 
Offentliga såväl som privata aktörer söker använda olika rättsliga medel för 
att stimulera, eller i vissa fall, blockera, klimatåtgärder. Europeiska 
unionens domstol avgjorde 2010 det så kallade ATAA-fallet, vari ett antal 
flygbolag ifrågasatt giltigheten i ett EU-direktiv som ålägger utsläppsrätter 
för flygindustrin. Fallet väckte grundläggande frågor om EU:s möjligheter 
att såsom en regional beslutsfattare ensidigt besluta om klimatåtgärder med 
inverkningar långt utanför EU:s eget territorium. 
 USA:s Högsta Domstol avgjorde 2007 och 2011 två relaterade fall, 
Massachusetts respektive AEP. Sökande i båda dessa fall efterfrågade 
klimatåtgärder på nationell nivå.  
 Samtliga dessa fall rör frågan om hur klimatåtgärder skall mobiliseras. 
Den här uppsatsen undersöker vilken roll högre domstolar har i att 
legitimisera och främja klimatåtgärder. En jämförelse av de tre fallen 
belyser hur likheter och skillnader i EU och USA påverkar domstolarnas roll 
i en klimatkontext. Den fokuserar på ett antal hinder mot rättslig prövning 
som aktualiserats i fallen – den så kallade ’displacement’-doktrinen och 
frågor om gränsdragningar mellan politiska och rättsliga frågor. 
 Genom att legitimisera och främja en vis typ av åtgärder verkar 
domstolarna för att bryta det ihållande politiska stillestånd som råder i 
debatten om hur vi ska förhindra klimatförändringar. 
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1 Introduction  
“It is my hope that this report shocks us into action”.1 This is the first 
sentence in a report published by the World Bank in 2012. It depicts the 
scenario of a four degree warmer world, a scenario that “scientists are 
nearly unanimously predicting by the end of the century, without serious 
policy changes”.2  
 The report concludes that the predicted 4
o
C global temperature rise 
“simply must not be allowed to occur”3 – demanding instant, cooperative 
policy action in response to the prevailing lack of strategies on how to deal 
with climate change.  
 So far, ongoing efforts to combat climate change have proven 
insufficient. Efficient international regulatory measures are conspicuous by 
their absence. Voluntary marked-based mechanisms and civil society action 
have not been able to influence corporations to reduce pollution. The 
victims of climate change stand without remedies, and nature remains 
scantily protected.
4
 
 Simultaneous to this immobilization, an outburst in new types of 
environmental governance institutions can be observed, inter alia an 
establishment of specialized environmental courts and tribunals, 
specializing in disputes relating to the environment, natural resources and 
land use.
5
 Parallel to this, a surge in climate-related litigation in general 
courts can be noticed, both at national, subnational and supranational level.
6
 
To exemplify, the US passed from one climate-related case brought in 2003, 
to over a hundred cases by 2010.
7
 In the EU, the EU ETS Directive alone 
had, by the end of 2008, already been challenged in 40 actions before the 
CJEU.
8
 As policy-making is not advancing, litigation has come to represent 
a battleground and a forum for debate: a means to petition governments to 
                                                 
1
 World Bank. 2012. “Turn down the heat: why a 4°C warmer world must be avoided.” 
Washington DC: World Bank. p. ix  
2
 Ibid. p. ix 
3
 Ibid p. 64 
4
 UNEP. 2011. “Building the Climate Change Regime. Survey and Analysis of 
Approaches.” United Nations Environment Programme, World Resources Institute. p. 2  
5
 Pring, Catherine K., Pring, George R. 2009. “Greening Justice: Creating and  
Improving Environmental Courts and Tribunals.” The Access Initiative. pp. ix 
6
 Osofsky, Hari M. 2007. “Climate Change Litigation as Pluralist Legal Dialogue?” 
Stanford Journal of International Law, Vol. 26 & Stanford Journal of International Law, 
Vol 43(Joint Issue). p. 181  
7
 Gerrard, Michael B., Wannier, Gregory E. 2012. “United States of America.” In Climate 
Change Liability.Transnational Law and Practice, edited by Richard Lord QC, Silke 
Goldberg, Lavanya Rajamani, Jutta Brunnée. 562 
8
 Ghaleigh, Navraj Singh. 2009. “Emissions Trading Before the European Court of 
Justice: Market Making in Luxembourg.” In Legal Aspects of Carbon Trading: 
Kyoto, Copenhagen and Beyond, edited by David Freestone and Charlotte Streck. p. 11-12 
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take protective action – or, the opposite – to prevent public interventions 
into the individual freedom to act, to contract – to pollute. Ultimately, what 
takes place within the ambit of a climate change lawsuit provides for a 
measurement of the current state of affairs of environmental protection.
9
  
 The adjudication of climate change politics is a fairly new 
phenomenon, and its role and impact still under debate. One such discussion 
concerns the impact on regulatory governance and the possibilities of courts 
to fill in the regulatory gap caused by inadequate governmental action.
10
 In 
2004, two separate lawsuits were filed in US district courts, to later on reach 
the Supreme Court on appeal. The Massachusetts
11
 and the AEP
12
 cases 
both concerned the possibilities to ‘stimulate’ regulatory action by the 
federal US government – and the question of what to do if action fails to 
come off. In 2009, the ATAA
13
 case reached the CJEU through a preliminary 
reference procedure, in essence concerning the legitimacy of EU climate 
change regulations in the lacuna of international action.  
 Through a comparative analysis, this thesis will examine the role of 
the judiciary in climate change action. By this I hope to contribute to the 
ongoing discourse on future pathways for environmental governance. 
 
1.1 Purpose and Research Question 
With European Court of Justice and US Supreme Court climate-related 
litigation as the point of departure, I have studied the Courts guided by the 
following research question: 
 
What is the role of the judiciary in legitimizing climate change 
action? 
 
The thesis presents the opinion that courts have an important role in 
encouraging climate change action, in identifying and encouraging action. 
In order to consider this, the thesis will first analyze how the Court 
judgments contribute to legitimizing a certain institution or type of policy 
                                                 
9
 Osofsky, Hari M. 2010. “The Continuing Importance of Climate Change Litigation.” In 
Climate Law 1: 3-29. p. 4 
10
 Ibid. p. 43 
11
 Commonwealth of Massachusetts, et Al., Petitioners v. Environmental Protection Agency, 
Respondent Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, et Al., Intervenors, 415 F.3d 50, 367 
U.S. App. D.C. 282 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
12
 State of Connecticut, et al., Plaintiffs,v. American Electric Power Company, Inc., et al., 
Defendants.Open Space Institute, et al., Plaintiffs, v.American Electric Power Company, 
Inc., et al., Defendants. 406 F.Supp.2d 265 (2005) 
13
 Case C-366/10 The Air Transport Association of America, American Airlines, Inc, 
Continental Airlines, Inc, United Airlines, Inc v The Secretary of State for Energy and 
Climate Change (2011) OJ C260/9. 
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making, and second, how the Court’s perception of its own role is reflected 
in the cases. 
 The subject of analysis is motivated by the importance of the EU and 
the US as actors in the combat of global climate change. Not only their 
stances in international negotiations, but also their internal policy 
development will have a considerable effect on the prospect of combatting 
climate change. Furthermore, the CJEU and the US Supreme Court are both 
recognized as two of the world’s most powerful high Courts, with 
significant impact on their respective legal systems.
14
  
 Climate change is a ‘multiscalar’ problem with both highly 
transnational and highly local characteristics.
15
 Its governance remains at an 
initial stage of development, still struggling with the fundamental question 
of where and how to take decisive action. It will require progress both at 
national and international level, including some degree of harmonization. 
There are therefore numerous reasons to take a comparative look at the role 
of a major actor in climate change policy debate: the high Courts of the EU 
and the USA. 
  
1.2 Dispostion 
This thesis is divided into three main parts. First follows a brief overview of 
EU and US policy approaches to climate change in order to outline the 
characteristics of the two systems and to situate the role occupied by the 
high Courts. This overview is in no sense intended as a complete record of 
American and European polity. The purpose is to give a background to the 
cases and by a brief comparison identify key characteristics of relevance to 
climate change litigation.  
 The main section of the thesis will assess the way in which the Courts 
contribute to legitimize and thus encourage climate change action. The role 
and functioning of the US Supreme Court and the European Court of Justice 
respectively will be described and the case studies analyzed separately under 
each system.  
 The final section will compare the findings from the American and 
European case studies to draw conclusions of a more general application. 
 
                                                 
14
 Sweet, Alec Stone. 2011. “The European Court of Justice.” In The Evolution of EU Law, 
edited by Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 121 
15
 Osofsky, Hari M. 2008. “Is Climate Change 'International'? Litigation's Diagonal 
Regulatory Role.” Virginia Journal of International Law 49:3. p. 587 
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1.3 Method 
The method used is initially a traditional dogmatic method, studying both 
systems separately. This is followed by a comparative analysis. Three cases 
form the subject of analysis: the American Massachusetts v. EPA and AEP 
v. Connecticut cases and the European ATAA case. These cases are 
considered as landmark judgments and have been widely discussed by 
academia.
16
 In their very essence they touch upon the issue of which 
institutions are best situated as policy-makers.  
 The materials used to analyze the cases are mainly legal doctrine and 
related case law. Despite the fairly short history of climate change litigation, 
a considerable amount of research has been devoted to its characteristics, 
role and impact, notably in the USA but also more and more in the EU.
17
  
1.4 Delimitations 
In both the EU and the US the supranational/federal high court judgments 
represent but a minor share of all litigation. An analysis of cases brought on 
US state or EU Member State level would give a more comprehensive 
picture of the state of climate change litigation, but is an undertaking better 
apt for a dissertation (if even so). The high Court judgments do however 
give a representative picture of the broad lines of reasoning of the judiciary 
as a whole. Together with the fact that the high Courts represent the final 
instance for appeal, and the impact these Court judgments have on the entire 
                                                 
16
 See for instance on Massachusetts: Adler, Jonathan. 2007. “Warming Up to Climate 
Change Litigation” Virginia Law Review, Vol. 93, No. 61; Osofsky, Hari M. 2007. “The 
Intersection of Scale, Science and Law in Massachusetts v. EPA” in Adjucating Climate 
Change: State, National and International Approaches edited by William C.G. Burns and 
Hari M. Osofsky, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. See on AEP: Adler, Jonathan. 
2011. “A Tale of Two Climate Cases.” 121 Yale Law Journal Online 109. Accessible at < 
http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/09/13/adler.html>; Osofsky, Hari M. 2012. “Litigation's 
Role in the Path of U.S. Federal Climate Change Regulation: Implications of AEP v. 
Connecticut”. Valparaiso University Law Review 46 (2):447-457. See on ATAA: 
Bogojević, Sanja. 2012. “Legalising Environmental Leadership: A Comment on the 
CJEU’S Ruling in C-366/10 on the Inclusion of Aviation in the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme.” Journal of Environmental Law 24: 345–56; Fahey, Elaine. 2012. “The EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme and the Court of Justice: The “High Politics” of Indirectly 
Promoting Global Standards.” In Special Issue Deciphering Regulatory and Constitutional 
Competence Between EU Environmental Law and Global Governance edited by Elaine 
Fahey and Ester Herlin-Karnell. German Law Journal 13 (11):1147-1268.; Mayer, Benoit. 
2012. “Case C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America and Others v. Secretary of 
State for Energy and Climate Change, with annotation by B. Mayer.” Common Market Law 
Review 49 (3). 
17
 See footnote 16. See also Bogojević, Sandra. 2013. “EU Climate Change Litigation, the 
Role of the European Courts, and the Importance of Legal Culture.” Law & Policy; 
Osofsky, Hari M. 2005. “The Geography of Climate Change Litigation: Implications for 
Transnational Regulatory Governance.” Washington University Law Quarterly 83:1789 
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judiciary, the US Supreme Court and the CJEU judgments serve as an 
appropriate point of departure for this study. 
 In the cases I have chosen to focus on a few barriers to judicial review 
(displacement, the political question doctrine) and the way the Courts 
generally contribute to encourage climate change action. While many other 
issues were raised in the cases these are excluded due to lack of space. Also 
important to underline, this thesis does not aim to undertake an analysis of 
specific legal issues that were invoked in the cases. The purpose is to 
analyze, in broader terms, the way the Courts contribute to climate change 
action. 
 The differences between the US and the EU legal systems and the 
different points of departure have had an impact on the analysis. Here an 
important remark on the choice of wording must be made: while the 
Massachusetts and AEP cases dealt with the question of enabling climate 
change regulations where none such existed, the ATAA case dealt with the 
legality of already existing regulations (the EU Aviation Directive),
18
 which 
in turn had been adopted in response to an overarching, global regulatory 
gap. Thus, in the latter case, the Court has a legitimizing rather than 
enabling function. 
  
 
  
                                                 
18
 Directive 2008/101 of the European Parliament and of the European Council amending 
Directive 2003/87 so as to include aviation activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas 
emission allowance trading within the Community [2009] OJ L8/3. 
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2 The Role of the Judiciary in 
EU and US Approaches to 
Climate Change – an Overview 
In order to introduce the reader into the topic and to situate the court cases 
in their larger context, a brief overview of the characteristics of climate 
change policy in the EU and USA respectively will follow. Although many 
common denominators exist, some major discrepancies influence the way 
the EU and the USA handle the issue of climate change. Due to the shared 
social, economic and political foundations, European and American 
legislation reveal many similarities, and in both regions, environmental 
protection ranks relatively high on the political agenda.
19
 Both the US and 
the EU have an independent judicial body with two very powerful high 
courts – the US Supreme Court and the European Court of Justice – which 
show considerable similarities in goals and institutional characteristics.
20
 
There are however significant differences between the EU and the USA, 
both at systemic as well as substance level, which impact on the functioning 
of the judiciary in the climate change context.  
 
2.1 Polity 
To grasp and compare the role of the judiciary in EU and US climate change 
policy action, some basic understanding of the political structures 
characterizing both entities is necessary. The US is a Constitution based 
federal republic. Its legal system is characterized as a common law system 
at the federal level. So is also the case in all states but Louisiana, whose 
legal system is based on Napoleonic civil code.
21
 The EU is not a federation 
but a “hybrid intergovernmental and supranational organization”.22 The EU 
                                                 
19
 Kimber, Cliona J. M. 1995. “A Comparison of Environmental Federalism in the United 
States and the European Union.” Maryland Law Review. 54:1658-1690. p. 1658 
20
 Fabbrini, Sergio. 2004. “The EU in American Perspective.” In Restructuring 
Territoriality: Europe and the United States Compared, edited by Christopher K. Ansell, 
Giuseppe Di Palma. Cambridge University Press. p. 184; Juenger, Friedrich. 1984. 
“Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States and the European Communities: A Comparison.” 
Michigan Law Review 82 Festschrift in Honor of Eric Stein  (5/6):1195-1212  
21
 CIA, United States.The World Factbook. Accessible at 
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html>. Last updated 
7 May 2013. 
22
 CIA, European Union. The World Factbook. Accessible at 
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/countrytemplate_ee.html>. Last updated 6 May 2013. Preliminary statement. 
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has no constitution in the strict sense, but is described as based on the rule 
of law, its foundation as having “constitutional character”23 based on the 
Treaties – and the CJEU as a “constitutional court”.24 
 Both the EU and the USA are characterized by a vertical separation of 
powers (between the federal government/the EU and the states/Member 
States) alongside a horizontal separation of powers (between institutions at 
the same hierarchy in the federal system).
25
 Both Courts have an important 
role to play in filling the legal gaps and ambiguities that result from the 
shared competences of these separate institutions. Fabbrini argues that the 
many checks and balances that exist in both systems in order to preserve the 
institutional balance serve to encourage courts to fill this void.
26
 For 
instance, the US legislative process requires that new laws pass both houses 
of the Congress and get signed by the President.
27
 In the EU, the most 
widely used legislative procedure is the ordinary legislative procedure, 
requiring an accord between the Commission, the European Parliament and 
the Council of Ministers.
28
 
 Osofsky has discussed the gap-filling role of litigation in the climate 
change context specifically, arguing that it will  
 
remain an important lever within transnational regulation of climate 
change in part because of the way in which they engage the cross-
cutting nature of the problem. Their ability to rescale and to connect 
people across spatial and temporal scales— together with their 
interaction with many areas of law, from environmental to corporate 
to tort to urban planning—makes them an important piece in an 
ongoing regulatory dialogue.
29
 
 
The courts’ role can consequently be found in their very nature– in the 
precise capacity to accommodate and balance claims from different actors 
that would otherwise face significant ‘transaction costs’ in order to debate 
their claims. 
 
2.2 The Viability of Climate Action 
To better understand the cases analyzed, the context in which they rose is of 
importance – the context of national inaction relevant to the US cases, and 
                                                                                                                            
Lenaerts, Koen, Van Nuffel, Piet, European Union Law, 3
rd
 Edition, 2011, Sweet & 
Maxwell. pp. 16 and 25 
23
 Ibid. p. 22 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Fabbrini (2004) p. 184 
26
 Fabbrini (2004) p. 182 
27
 US Constitution Art. I 
28
 TFEU Art. 289 and 294  
29
 Osofsky (2010) p. 28 
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the international inaction relevant to the EU case. For a more thorough 
outline of EU-internal climate policy, the reader will have to turn elsewhere. 
 
2.2.1 US National Climate Action  
The Massachusetts and AEP claims were brought in a situation where new 
US legislative action on climate change was not likely to be adopted in a 
near future. Similarly, the ATAA case took place in a situation where the 
prospect a binding and enforceable international agreement was all but 
certain. The role of the judiciary must be analyzed against the background 
of this policy inaction. 
On the US national level, climate change policy has been 
characterized as lacking substantive legal content:  
 
The US federal government has, arguably, abdicated its role as the 
national leader in many spheres of environmental law, certainly in 
climate change law and policy.
30
 
 
According to Osofsky, a combination of scientific uncertainties, public 
skepticism, political division between the legislative and executive branches 
of the US government, in addition to the dividing line running between the 
Senate and the House of Representatives following last elections “limits the 
viability of new climate change legislation” in the US.31 This is combined 
with a patchwork of different regimes, assigned to different agencies to be 
handled separately.
32
 Overall, these elements contribute to a fragmented 
drawn-out political process, resulting in climate inaction. 
 The Clean Air Act was passed in the Senate in the 1970s, in a context 
where environmental concerns was given a much more prominent position 
on the political agenda than during recent years. Until the Massachusetts 
judgment,
33
 the Bush administration argued that GHGs were not ‘air 
pollutants’ as covered by the Act, a stance endorsed by EPA itself.34 The 
Obama administration has taken some steps to enhance the combat of 
climate change, but is also characterized by a major incapacity to take 
decisive legislative action.
35
 For instance, the 2009 ACES
36
 energy bill, 
                                                 
30
 Carlarne, Cinnamon. 2010. Climate Change Law and Policy: EU and US Approaches 
Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. (2010) p. 35 
31
 Osofsky (2012) p.449  
32
 Ibid. 
33
 Massachusetts, et Al., Petitioners v. Environmental Protection Agency et Al. v EPA, 127 
S Ct 1438 (2007) 
34
 Burtraw, Dallas, Fraas, Arthur G., Richardson, Nathan D. 2011. “Greenhouse Gas 
Regulation Under the Clean Air Act: A Guide for Economists.” Resources for the Future 
Discussion Paper No. 11-08. p. 1 
35
 Carlarne (2010) p. 54 
36
 H.R.2454 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 
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proposing a national cap-and-trade system, failed to pass the Senate. The 
President has also taken part in recent COPs
37
 without being able to present 
concrete commitments on the part of the United States, thus hampering 
international accord. Absent Congressional support, ambitious climate 
change objectives are unlikely to be concretized through legislation. Thus 
the prospect of legislative action remains uncertain, leaving “any near-
future federal action on carbon emissions in familiar hands: the Clean Air 
Act”.38 
 In this context, the federal administrative agency assigned the 
protection of human health and the environment – the US Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA)
39
 – is given a central role. Indeed, federal 
agencies represent the major source of environmental governance – through 
regulations, enforcement proceedings or through judicial challenges against 
their actions or omissions. Endowed with both legislative, implementing and 
enforcing powers, the regulation of GHGs falls to a large extent on the lot of 
EPA.
40
  
 For the sake of comparison, there is no supranational administrative 
environmental agency in the EU. Implementation of EU legislation is 
instead conducted at national level, to a certain extent subject to the 
supervision of the European Commission. This often leaves discretion to the 
Member States in interpreting, implementing and enforcing EU 
environmental rules, which in turn creates a need upon national courts to 
ensure a conform interpretation and application of Union law.
41
  
 
2.2.2 The International Institutional Failure 
In the ATAA case, the development on the international level is more 
relevant. In the words of Preston: 
 
A comprehensive and action-forcing international treaty, ratified by 
all the major contributors to global warming, is regarded as the 
preferable choice to address the global warming phenomenon, as 
collective action taken by all nation states is what is required in order 
to meaningfully combat climate change.
42
 
 
                                                 
37
 Conference of the Parties to the 1992 UNFCCC 
38
 Burtraw (2011) p. 1 
39
 EPA, Our Mission and What We Do <http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa/our-mission-and-
what-we-do>, accessed 20 April 2013. Last updated 10 April 2013. 
40
 Climate Regulations under Section 111 of the Clean Air Act, Center for Climate Change 
Law, Columbia Law School, <http://web.law.columbia.edu/climate-
change/resources/climate-regulations-under-section-111-clean-air-act>, accessed 1 March 
2013; Carlarne (2010) p. 54 
41
 Carlarne (2010) p. 320 
42
 Preston, Brian J. 2011. “Climate Change Litigation (Part 1).” Carbon & Climate Law 
Review 5 (1):3-14. p.3 
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However, such a comprehensive and action-forcing international treaty does 
not exist. The international community has failed to issue an overarching 
global framework to effectively combat climate change. Despite decades of 
international negotiations, the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC)
43
 lacks binding hard obligations, and the 
supplementing Kyoto Protocol
44
 is characterized by weak enforcement 
mechanisms, a low compliance among its signatories and commitments that 
do not correspond to the reductions demanded for by scientists. Major 
emitters such as the USA, China and India fall outside the reach of binding 
emission reduction targets.
45
 
 There are many reasons why international law can be seen as ill-
equipped to deal with the problem of climate change. To mention some, 
climate change is an issue of extreme complexity, with a range of different 
actors involved, characterized by problems related to collective action. The 
majority of harm has yet to occur and the causation is non-linear. And 
finally, the success of the negotiations depends on the willingness of states 
to accept limitations to their national sovereignty.
46
 
 In both the European and the North American a context of inaction the 
role of the judiciary will, as will be further developed below, to identify and 
enable a more viable road to climate action. 
 
2.3 Adversial Legalism – Eurolegalism 
Another important element in the comparison of the role played by the 
judiciary in the EU and US system is the view on court interventions in the 
development of policies. The notion of ‘adversarial legalism’ originates 
from the American system, where litigation traditionally has a deeply rooted 
function in the ongoing process of lawmaking.
47
 This can be exemplified by 
the substantial law-making and remedial powers given to the courts, the 
political selection of judges, right to class action, frequent judicial review, 
interventions into administrative decisions and strong, punitive legal 
sanctions. Adversial legalism is even held to reflect deliberate government 
encouragement of judicial action to help implement public policy.
48
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Notably, within the environmental policy field, adversarial legalism has 
played a prominent role, both to block and enhance environmental 
protection measures.
49
  
 The role of litigation in EU climate change policy-making is less 
pronounced than under the American legal system. On a general level, the 
notion of ‘Eurolegalism’, introduced by Kelemen, denotes  
 
a mode of governance that relies on detailed rules containing strict 
transparency and disclosure requirements; legalistic and adversarial 
approaches to regulatory enforcement and dispute resolution; slow, costly 
legal contestation; active judicial review of administrative action; and 
empowerment of private actors to enforce legal norms.
50
 
 
However, in the climate change context specifically, several scholars have 
emphasized the command-and-control style of EU governance – a 
“bureaucratic, impersonal form of legalism, wherein the courts are less 
intimately involved in the minutiae of law-making”.51 In a comparison to US 
litigation, Ghaleigh argues that the CJEU litigation is less impact-oriented 
and of a more technical character:  
 
The EU ETS litigation is not concerned with the impacts of climate 
change (declining snow packs, costs of adaption to sea level rises etc) 
but rather the finessing of a new market mechanism from the perspective 
of key market actors within the established confines of EU law.
52
 
 
This view is also shared by Bogojević. In an exposé over recent climate 
change jurisprudence in the EU, she concludes that the main focus of this 
litigation has been the boundaries of EU regulatory competences already 
exercised, rather than the interest of mobilizing climate change action.
53
 
 What can be concluded is that both Courts share a tradition of 
intervening in policy development, through their interpretation of law, in 
order to uphold rule of law and safeguard important societal interests. This 
tradition however takes different expressions in the EU and the US 
respectively. 
2.4 Litigation Typology 
To give a very short overview, the cases brought before the CJEU are 
predominantly of an administrative character, i.e. claims relating to the 
validity or interpretation of specific regulations such as the Aviation 
                                                 
49
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Directive or the EU ETS. These claims are generally brought by Member 
States and the European Commission to safeguard the institutional balance 
of the Union, or, as the ATAA case, by private sector parties seeking to limit 
the scope of restrictions into their economic interests. Due to the pro-
environmental objectives of the EU ETS, and the very strict standing 
requirements for individuals, litigation rarely occurs in order to promote 
climate change action.
54
  
 The US court cases are brought mainly as statutory or administrative 
challenges, such as in Massachusetts, and less commonly as common law 
claims, such as AEP (or as constitutional claims). The US judicial system 
does provide for a possibility for individuals seeking remedies for the 
effects of climate change within the ambit of common law public nuisance 
claims. Claims are here primarily brought by environmental NGOs against 
the federal or state governments.
55
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3 Climate Change Litigation in 
the USA 
Here will first follow some general remarks concerning the US judicial 
system. Under the case analysis the doctrine of legislative displacement and 
the political question doctrine will be treated, as these barriers to judicial 
review were of particular relevance to the Massachusetts and AEP cases. 
 
3.1 The Role of the US Supreme Court in 
Climate Change Action 
One may ask what role a court can play in a total absence of enforceable 
climate change policy. However, as this thesis aims to show, there is an 
important role to fulfill in the legitimizing and thus promotion of such 
policy action, in the stages preceding its creation.  
 The US judiciary is composed of a complex and vast system of state 
and federal courts existing alongside each other. While state courts – far 
more numerous – play an active part in the everyday life of citizens, the 
federal courts’ rulings resound through both systems and establish broad 
legal rules whose impact extends further than to the parties of the case.
56
 
There are both state and federal trial and appellate courts but the Supreme 
Court
57
 is the highest tribunal for disputes arising under the US Constitution 
or US laws. 
 
3.1.1 The Power of the Court 
Dahl writes that “[t]o consider the Supreme Court of the United States 
strictly as a legal institution is to underestimate its significance in the 
American political system.”58 Particular features of this system allows for 
the Court to play such a unique role. The power to perform a judicial review 
– that is, to interpret the Constitution and assess the constitutionality of 
federal and state government actions – is not provided for by the 
Constitution, but has traditionally been the primary functioning of the court. 
                                                 
56
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It can be derived from the Marbury v. Madison
59
 and Fletcher v. Peck
60
 
judgments. It is however also a product of “a broad liberal tradition”61 
allowing for the adjudication of high politics. 
 The Supreme Court can be described as having a broad freedom of 
action. To begin with, this can be traced to its public legitimacy and a high 
degree of recognition and compliance by other judges, administrators and 
the legislator that follows upon its judgments, despite the criticism and 
debate that surround many of them. The Supreme Court has a long record of 
interventions into public policy, although periods of increased and reduced 
activity alternate.
62
 It has invalidated legislative acts and regulations, both of 
state and federal origin, and can thus in some situations be seen as directly 
opposing the other branches of the government.
63
 
 Furthermore, although Congress in theory is bestowed with certain 
institutional powers to cut the Court’s freedom of movement, the usage of 
these is in practice is strongly limited by the often strong political division 
between the executive branch and the legislative Congress. While the 
Supreme Court enjoys certain political influence, the judicial process is due 
to the political appointment of justices
64
 also to some extent influenced by 
politics.
65
 
 The Supreme Court's has historically encouraged the exercise of 
federal powers: “The overwhelming fact of the Supreme Court's political 
role over the past two hundred years has been its commitment to increasing 
and validating the power of the national government.”66 Even though cases 
exist where the Court has chosen to side with the states – these exceptions 
mainly serve to confirm the rule.
67
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3.1.2 Jurisdiction 
The Supreme Court has ‘appellate jurisdiction’ over decisions of lower 
federal courts and state court decisions when determining issues of federal 
law. It also has ‘original jurisdiction’, denoting the power to hear a case as 
the initial instance, in a limited amount of disputes arising between States or 
between States and the Federal Government.
68
 
 Article III of the Constitution defines the judicial function and 
delineates the jurisdiction that Congress can confer on federal courts. Nine 
types of ‘cases and controversies’69 fall under federal jurisdiction – either 
defined by their parties, or by their subject matter.
70
  
 In the context of climate change, the US judiciary has some important 
functions: First, it adjudicates the actions of the legislative, executive and 
administrative branches through its constitutional review. Second, it reviews 
the compatibility of agency actions with US legislation. And third, it 
contributes to the law-making process through court-made common law 
rules and principles.
71
  
 
3.1.3 Common Law 
The last of the above-mentioned functions will be further explained here, as 
it is related to the displacement finding in AEP and will have important 
implications for the future of climate change litigation in the USA. In this 
case the courts’ role as gap-fillers in the absence of regulatory action was 
questioned and to some extent blocked. 
 Instead of challenging state or governmental actions on the basis of a 
public statute or regulation, petitioners (private or public) may bring a 
public nuisance action against private individuals and companies based on 
torts, alleging that their acts or omissions contribute to climate change, 
resulting in specific harm to them.
72
 
 The available legal mechanisms under common law are limited, as 
neither the US Constitution nor any of its statutes recognize the right to a 
non-polluted environment. Common-law nuisance cases also represent a 
relatively small share of all US climate change litigation, but have received 
significant attention both in academia and in public debate. These cases are 
generally brought by states as parens patriae
73
 with a view to push federal 
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responses to the negative effects of climate change, e.g. concerns about state 
resources, the lack of federal action and the interest of the citizens of 
states.
74
  
 Many obstacles face applicants in these cases, inter alia the possibility 
that climate change legislation or regulations displace private liability 
causes of action. This issue had a major impact on the outcome in AEP v. 
Connecticut and will be therefore be discussed in more detail below. 
 First, a distinction must be made between federal public nuisance 
claims, which are exclusively based on common law
75
 – and state public 
nuisance claims, which can be either court-based or legislated.  
 Federal common law nuisance actions are intended to apply where – 
and only where – the federal or state legislator has left a judicial gap that 
needs to be filled.
76
 This is due to the fact that federal courts, unlike state 
courts, are not seen as courts with a general power to develop substantial 
law and to apply their own rules of decision. Only in two circumstances 
may federal common law be applied: either when Congress explicitly has 
assigned the courts power to do so (which is not the case in climate change 
policies), or, when federal rules need to be developed to protect special 
interests. The latter situation has been recognized in a number of climate-
related disputes, for instance in situations such as the AEP case, in which a 
state sues an emitter outside its own territory alleging that pollution is 
caused within the state.
77
 
 Even if this first condition is satisfied, a public nuisance claim may, as 
already indicated, be displaced by a government statute or regulation.  
 
3.1.3.1 Federal common law of public nuisance 
In a federal public nuisance cause of action, an “unreasonable interference 
with a right common to the general public” must be established.78 This 
includes significant interference with rights to for instance public health, 
safety, peace, comfort or convenience, or a conduct of a continuing nature 
that has a significant detrimental effect upon public rights.
79
 Due to the 
ambiguity of the definition, the exact meaning of ‘public nuisance’ is often 
decided by the courts on a case-by-case basis.
80
 At any rate, the right relied 
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upon by the plaintiff must be “common to the public as a class”,81 yet 
individualized. Of importance to the climate change context is that causation 
can be collective, meaning that any defendant that played a significant role 
in causing the harm can be held liable.
82
 
 
3.1.3.2 Why turn to federal common law of public 
nuisance? 
A predominant opinion among scholars appears to be that, while legislative 
measures ultimately are preferable, court-based policy making is 
nevertheless an important, even necessary compliment.
83
 It is neither 
optimal nor capable of addressing climate change problems alone, and it 
will inevitably fall on the elected branches to enact a comprehensive climate 
change policy, where all interests – economic as well as environmental – are 
taken into account: “In an ideal world, a democratic legislative process to 
control climate change would be preferable to the decisions of individual 
judges.”84 But common law is better than no law.  
 The potential of common law in the climate change context is hence 
essentially to be found in its role as a gap-filler. This was recognized in the 
Milwaukee case, where the Supreme Court pointed to the fact that “Illinois 
did not have any forum in which to protect its interests unless federal 
common law were created.”85 
 Federal common law is flexible enough to contend with the new and 
sometimes extreme types of injuries caused by climate change. It serves as a 
means of petitioning the federal government to take action, and, equally 
important, it is closely linked to the allocation of responsibility and costs 
related to the externalities of climate change. It may provide for a basis for 
compensation for personal or property damages where no such regulation 
exists; distributing costs from the victims of climate change to the 
contributors.
86
 
  
3.1.3.3 The doctrine of legislative displacement 
The doctrine of legislative displacement was given a decisive role in AEP v. 
Connecticut. A short outline of this procedural requirement will follow. 
 Under the displacement doctrine, judge-made common law is 
preempted if legislation authorizes the defendants’ behavior, or 
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comprehensively governs the type of conduct at issue, or speaks directly to 
the issue at hand.87 
 As previously noted, public nuisance claims are available only in 
situations that are neither covered by state nor federal legislation or 
regulations. In Matter of Oswego Barge Corp. the Supreme Court held that 
“separation-of powers concerns create a presumption in favor of pre-
emption of federal common law whenever it can be said that Congress has 
legislated on the subject”.88 However, where to draw this line is not all 
clear-cut. In Milwaukee, the Supreme Court maintained that this “involves 
an assessment of the scope of the legislation and whether the scheme 
established by Congress addresses the problem formerly governed by 
federal common law.”89 It also noted that “[t]he question is whether the field 
has been occupied, not whether it has been occupied in a particular 
manner.”90  
 Overall, the Milwaukee judgment showed that the existence of federal 
statutes or regulations in a certain field doesn’t automatically entail 
preemption. However, the Court applies a strict interpretation of the 
displacement criteria. Once Congress has pronounced on a matter there is no 
more room for federal common law.
91
  
 
3.1.4 The Political Question Doctrine 
Another aspect of court jurisdiction is the political question doctrine. This 
doctrine constitutes a barrier to judicial review and was brought to the fore 
in both Massachusetts and AEP. It also closely touches upon the issue of the 
courts’ role in climate change action.  
 The political question doctrine has traditionally been widely discussed 
in the American legal context, not least in the sphere of climate change 
litigation. Despite the fact that the US Constitution does not allow for a field 
of political questions beyond the reach of federal jurisdiction, this court-
created doctrine provides that courts should abstain from resolving 
constitutional issues that may interfere with the proper functioning of the 
other two federal branches.
92
 
 In essence it is a reflection of the idea of separation of powers, where 
each branch of the government ‘rules the roost’ of its own sphere. From the 
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Court’s perspective, this can be seen as a precautionary approach – a way of 
safeguarding the Court’s own legitimacy. If a court would adjudicate an 
issue that encroached on the sphere of the legislative or executive branch, 
these latter might refuse to comply with its decision, thus damaging the 
confidence in the judiciary. Therefore, the political question doctrine 
“relates not to the power of courts but to their willingness to decide certain 
kinds of cases.”93 
 First rooted in the Marbury v. Madison case of 1803,
94
 it was further 
specified in Baker v. Carr,
95
 where the Court outlined typical examples of 
non-justiciable questions. For instance, foreign relations were identified as 
one of the areas in which non-justiciable political questions routinely arise.
96
 
 The development of case law has given reason question the continued 
validity of the political questions doctrine. The doctrine has been applied 
only to a few, manifestly politicized cases since its creation.
97
 For instance 
in Bush v. Gore
98
 the Supreme Court handed down a judgment on the merits 
in a dispute concerning the presidential election, clearly undermining the 
principle. May concludes that the evolution of case law points to a rather 
limited application of the political questions doctrine.
99
 
 However, contrary to the abovementioned development, the political 
questions doctrine has been brought to the fore specifically in US climate 
change litigation. Cases concerning greenhouse gas emissions often have 
clear political aspects, such as the arguments that GHG regulation have been 
delegated to another branch of government, and that insufficient judicial 
tools exist to assess questions such as what level of pollution qualifies as a 
public nuisance.
100
  
 Gerrard elucidates the inherent dilemma of climate-related tort action: 
 
how to deal with the fact that the challenged actions (such as 
extracting oil and coal, and building automobiles) were not only 
lawful but were encouraged by the Government over a period of many 
years; how to apportion damages that resulted from the activities of 
millions of companies all over the world for a period of more than a 
century; and how to distribute money damages, when the victims 
number in the billions, are all over the world, and include many who 
are deceased and many more who are unborn.
101
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Up until the Massachusetts and AEP judgments were laid down, federal US 
courts had dismissed climate change litigation on grounds of non-justiciable 
political questions. As May explains, the result was that “the cause of action 
is dead on arrival. There is no answer, no discovery, no standing, no proof, 
and no opportunity to prove damages or “unreasonable” harm. Exit the 
case.”102  
 When analyzing the cases, the way the Supreme Court handles the 
displacement and political question doctrines will be further examined. The 
fact that a certain type of cases never would get judged on their merits 
would have the effect of limiting the role that courts can play in climate 
change action.   
 
3.2 Case Summaries 
The Massachusetts and the AEP were closely intertwined. The two lawsuits 
were filed concurrently in 2004, to some extent involving the same 
applicants and challenging the same basic issue, namely the federal 
government’s failure to act to regulate climate change. While the first case 
was filed as a statutory claim, the latter was filed under the federal common 
law of public nuisance. Already from the start it was understood that a 
successful outcome in Massachusetts would weaken the chances of securing 
the outcome in AEP. This was also the case. While the AEP judgment 
reaffirms the authorization of regulatory action as established in 
Massachusetts, and to some extent clarifies its scope, it also narrows the 
pathway to future action by curbing another type of policy making – that of 
judicial rule making through common law public nuisance claims. 
 
3.2.1.1 Massachusetts v. EPA 
In Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency,
103
 twelve American 
States along with several local governments and NGOs challenged EPA’s 
denial of a petition to regulate carbon dioxide and other GHG emissions 
from new motor vehicles under the CAA, together with an EPA general 
council memorandum claiming that the agency lacks statutory authority to 
adopt such regulation.
104
 The agency maintained that even if authority was 
found, the agency would not exercise its authority at the moment. 
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 The first federal court to hear the case, the District Court of Columbia 
(DC Circuit) dismissed the claims by a 2-1 vote in favor of EPA.
105
 
 In the Supreme Court,
106
 it was first assessed whether the applicants 
had standing to challenge EPA’s decision not to regulate GHGs. This was 
answered in the affirmative by the Court.
107
 It then proceeded to the merits 
of the case. Here the question was whether carbon dioxide qualifies as an 
“air pollutant” within the meaning of the CAA.108 The Court settled the 
issue against EPA, authorizing the agency to regulate GHGs as air 
pollutants under the Act.
109
 
 As an alternative basis, the EPA had held that it could decline to issue 
emission standards on the grounds of policy considerations not enumerated 
in the Act. The Supreme Court dismissed this argument, holding that once 
an endangerment finding is made, all reasons for inaction must correspond 
to the authorizing statute. EPA had offered no such “reasoned explanation” 
and the denial of the petition was thus held as arbitrary.
110
 
 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the applicants with a 5-4 
majority. Four justices dissented (Justices Roberts, Scalia, Thomas and 
Alito), arguing that the claims were non-justiciable political questions and 
that the applicants lacked standing.
111
 
 
3.2.1.2 AEP v. Connecticut 
 
In American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut,
112
 the States of 
Connecticut, New York, California, Iowa, New Jersey, Rhode Island, 
Vermont, and Wisconsin, and the City of New York (collectively 
“Connecticut”) brought claims against a number of power companies, 
representing the nation’s five largest emitters of carbon dioxide.113 The 
applicants claimed that the carbon emissions produced by the defendants, by 
contributing to global warming, “substantially and unreasonably interfered 
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with public rights”,114 harming the health, safety and well-being of their 
citizens. 
 The case was brought under federal common law and state public 
nuisance law.
115
 All applicants sought injunctive relief requiring the 
defendants to cap their carbon-dioxide emissions.
116
 They also asked the 
court to “assess and measure available alternative energy resources,” to be 
reconciled with US foreign and domestic policy.
117
 
 The decisive issue in the Supreme Court judgment was whether the 
applicants could use federal common law to curb the respondents’ carbon 
dioxide emissions as a public nuisance cause, or whether such a measure 
should be achieved solely through the legislative process. 
 In brief, while the lower instance Courts gave the political question 
doctrine a decisive role in determining the scope of its judicial review, the 
Supreme Court decided the case on grounds of displacement. 
 In 2005, the US District Court for the Southern District of New York 
dismissed the claim on the grounds that it raised “non-justiciable political 
questions”.118  
 As oral hearings were held in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
119
 
the US Supreme Court issued its landmark decision in Massachusetts. The 
Second Circuit reversed the District Court’s findings, concluding both that 
the applicants had standing and that climate change did not raise political 
questions.
120
 Furthermore, the Second Circuit held the Clean Air Act had 
not ‘displaced’ the federal common law of public nuisance.121 The Second 
Circuit concluded that the District Court had erred in dismissing the 
complaints, and remanded the case back to the District Court for further 
proceedings.
122
 
 The US Supreme Court never engaged in the political question issue, 
contrary to the lower instance Courts. Instead, the defendants’ argument that 
the Clean Air Act displaced the federal common law of public nuisance was 
taken on by the Court.
123
 
 On June 20, 2011, the Supreme Court handed down its judgment, 
reversing by a unanimous vote of 8-0 the Second Circuit’s ruling.  
                                                 
114
 American Electric Power Company, Inc., et Al., Petitioners v. Connecticut et Al. 131 S. 
CT. 2527 (2011) at 268 
115
 The alternative claim, whether state nuisance law was applicable to the case, was never 
addressed by the 2
nd
 Circuit Court, as it admitted the claims already as a federal common 
law nuisance. The Supreme Court, reversing the lower Court’s ruling on this matter, 
remanding this issue to the 2
nd
 Circuit for further consideration. 
116
 AEP v. Connecticut (2011) at 270 
117
 AEP v. Connecticut (2011) at 272 
118
 Connecticut v. AEP (2005) at 272 
119
 Connecticut v. AEP., Inc., 582 F. 3d 309 - Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit (2009) 
120
 Connecticut v. AEP., Inc. (2009) at 323-332 
121
 Connecticut v. AEP., Inc. (2009) at 315, 371-388 
122
 Connecticut v. AEP., Inc. (2009) at 393 
123
 AEP v. Connecticut (2011) at 2537 
 27 
 
3.2.2 The role of the administration vs. the role 
of the Court 
The Massachusetts case has been widely discussed in academia, and 
somewhat opposing views on its actual significance have been expressed. 
As pointed out by Watts and Wildermuth – the case does in no sense order 
the EPA to regulate GHG emissions, but merely allows for such regulations: 
 
The ruling, in other words, leaves the EPA free to decide not to 
regulate, so long as it provides adequate justification for its 
decision.  This means that what the media has touted as the "global 
warming" case may not actually lead to the regulation of global 
warming at all under the current CAA.
124
 
  
In a comment, Adler maintains that despite this fact, in practice the 
judgment “gives the Agency little option but to regulate”.125 He predicts that 
new GHG regulations on various sectors will be adopted as an effect of the 
case. However, as will be discussed below, it appears from the AEP 
judgment that this latter view is not shared by the Court. 
 In its assessment whether EPA authorization to regulate GHGs can be 
found in the CAA, the Supreme Court declares having “little trouble 
concluding that it does.”126 This stance is taken directly from the text of the 
Act, which provides that EPA shall regulate “any air pollutant”127 from new 
motor vehicles which can be deduced to endanger public health or welfare. 
The discord of EPA lies in that carbon dioxide does not qualify as such an 
‘air pollutant’, but the Court holds the statute to be “unambiguous”.128 The 
Court goes no further than a textual interpretation of the wording of the 
CAA in its justification of EPA’s mandate, and dismisses the agency’s 
interpretation that Congress had intended to curtail its power.
129
 
 AEP v. Connecticut can be seen as a follow-up and a specification of 
the aforementioned judgment. While it has been described as a major win 
for ‘environmentalists’ seen to the Court’s opening on standing 
requirements – and possible opening on the political question issue – its 
implications for the question of climate change governance is multifaceted. 
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 Here the displacement finding serves as the drawing-line between two 
alternative routes for climate change policy making. While the statutory 
claim in Massachusetts, was decided on the merits and recognized by the 
Court, AEP concerned the prospect of court made common law – an option 
that was firmly rejected by the Court itself, on grounds of barriers to judicial 
review. 
 In the AEP Opinion, Justice Ginsberg concludes that “the Clean Air 
Act and the EPA actions it authorizes displace any federal common law 
right to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired 
power plants.”130  
 The Court comes to this conclusion by arguing that the Congress, 
when it enacted the Clean Air Act, pronounced on who should regulate 
GHG emissions, i.e. EPA. This view had been upheld by the Supreme Court 
itself in Massachusetts, and EPA had followed up on that decision by 
undertaking new greenhouse gas regulations.
131
 
 Worth mentioning is that the Second Circuit in AEP had come to a 
different conclusion than the Supreme Court on the displacement issue. The 
lower Court applied a more flexible standard than the Supreme Court when 
measuring the amount of overlap that existed between the CAA and the 
specific request made by the applicants. Referring to the Milwaukee case, 
where it was held that the remedy sought must be “’within the precise scope 
of remedies prescribed by Congress’"132, the Court concluded that it was 
competent to review the claims until that time comes when new federal laws 
or regulations indeed will pre-empt the federal common law at stake.
133
 
 Inter alia, the Second Circuit addressed the fact that the CAA 
authorizes EPA to regulate – but does not oblige it to do so. As confirmed in 
Massachusetts, the CAA requires regulation of GHG emissions from new 
motor vehicles only if EPA makes an endangerment finding. Since EPA had 
not yet actually regulated GHG – only propositions had been made on the 
part of EPA – the appeals Court found that current regulatory measures did 
not suffice to “regulate greenhouse gases in a way that ‘speaks directly’ to 
Applicants' problems”.134 Therefore, the CAA could not be held to displace 
the plaintiff’s remedies under federal common law. 
 The Supreme Court in AEP came to a different conclusion. On the 
question whether displacement may take place before EPA has exercised its 
regulatory authority, the Court held that: 
 
The critical point is that Congress delegated to EPA the decision 
whether and how to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions from power 
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plants; the delegation is what displaces federal common law. Indeed, 
were EPA to decline to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions altogether 
at the conclusion of its ongoing §7411 rulemaking, the federal courts 
would have no warrant to employ the federal common law of nuisance 
to upset the agency’s expert determination.135 
 
This last sentence shows a much stricter analysis of the preconditions for 
displacement, and implies that even in the case that EPA would remain 
inactive, no other option than the regulatory way is available to interested 
parties wanting to encourage environmental protection. Even in the case that 
EPA would renounce to regulate GHG emissions from new motor vehicles, 
a federal common law suit would stand no chances.  
 The Supreme Court reaffirms the possibility of civil judicial review. 
Justice Ginsberg maintains that in the event of an omission by EPA to 
regulate emissions, States and private parties may petition the agency to act, 
whereby EPA’s response to such a petition will be reviewable by federal 
courts. The Court concludes that the CAA provides for “a means to seek 
limits on emissions of carbon dioxide from domestic power plants” – and the 
Court sees “no room for a parallel track.”136 Justice Ginsberg very 
unambiguously notes: 
 
It is altogether fitting that Congress designated an expert agency, here, 
EPA, as best suited to serve as primary regulator of greenhouse gas 
emissions. The expert agency is surely better equipped to do the job 
than individual district judges issuing ad hoc, case-by-case 
injunctions. Federal judges lack the scientific, economic, and 
technological resources an agency can utilize in coping with issues of 
this order. … Judges may not commission scientific studies or 
convene groups of experts for advice, or issue rules under notice-and-
comment procedures inviting input by any interested person, or seek 
the counsel of regulators in the States where the defendants are 
located. Rather, judges are confined by a record comprising the 
evidence the parties present.
137
 
 
The Court here clearly situates itself in a larger net of different functions 
when it comes to dealing with climate change. The empowerment of EPA 
and the enabling of regulatory action first established in Massachusetts is 
upheld by the Supreme Court in AEP.  
 
3.2.2.1 Overlapping institutional mandates 
 
While the AEP case dealt with EPA’s mandate in relation to the Court’s 
own jurisdiction, Massachusetts dealt with the agency’s mandate in relation 
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to other political institutions. EPA had argued that the regulation of carbon 
dioxide would require improving the fuel economy – a mandate that 
Congress already had designated the Department of Transportation to hold. 
Therefore any EPA action on the issue would conflict with this latter 
mandate, or be superfluous.
138
 Furthermore, the agency argued that 
unilateral EPA action would create a piecemeal result that conflicted with 
the President’s “comprehensive approach” and risked “hampering the 
President’s ability to persuade key developing countries to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions.”139 
 The Supreme Court dismissed these arguments, holding that an 
eventual overlap between different agency mandates “in no way licenses 
EPA to shirk its duty to protect the public ‘health’ and ‘welfare’”.140 
 The Court thus empowers EPA as a policy maker alongside other 
political institutions or agencies, recognizing that overlapping mandates 
may exist and even be necessary.  
 
3.2.3 The Justiciability of Climate Action in AEP 
and Massachusetts 
A second issue dealt with by the two cases was the delimitation between 
judiciable legal questions and non-judiciable political questions, framed as 
the political question doctrine.  
 As the AEP case rose through the court hierarchy, it underwent a 
transformation: the District Court and the Second Circuit had emphasized 
the justiciability issue, however with different conclusions. While the 
District Court dismissed the applicants’ claims, referring to “the 
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind 
clearly for nonjudicial discretion”,141 the Second Circuit conversely 
concluded that climate change did not raise non-justiciable political 
questions.
142
 The Supreme Court granted certiori (granted an appeal) inter 
alia on the delimitation between non-political and political questions. 
However, during the proceedings, it declined to engage in the political 
question doctrine, but dismissed the claims on grounds of displacement. The 
only comment on the issue can be found in Justice Ginsburg’s opinion:  
 
Four members of the Court would hold that at least some applicants 
have Article III standing under Massachusetts, which permitted a State 
to challenge EPA’s refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions […] 
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and, further, that no other threshold obstacle bars review. Four 
members of the Court, adhering to a dissenting opinion in 
Massachusetts […] or regarding that decision as distinguishable, 
would hold that none of the applicants have Article III standing.
143
 
 
This implies that the four first-mention Justices apparently also rejected the 
political question defense. Four justices disagreed. However, as Justice 
Sotomayor had been recused from the case, uncertainties remain as to which 
opinion she would have sided with, had she been present. This could imply 
that the Supreme Court opens up for climate change climate change 
litigation, in line with Massachusetts, not holding the political aspects of the 
cases as barring court review. Only where cases are specifically displaced 
by the CAA, the Court’s jurisdiction will be limited.144  
 As a whole, a decision that manifestly went against the applicants on 
political question grounds would likely have been far more detrimental to 
parties seeking to encourage climate change action through litigation than 
the displacement finding was, as this latter is more limited in terms of the 
types of litigation covered. In this way, the Court keeps some doors open for 
its own participation in the development of climate action.  
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4 Climate Change Litigation in 
the EU 
4.1 The Role of CJEU in Climate Change Action 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is the judicial 
institution of the Union.
145
 It consists of the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ), which is the highest court, and the General Court (EGC),
146
 as well 
as the Civil Service Tribunal (ECST), dealing with EU staff disputes.
147
 
There is no specialized environmental court at EU level. This analysis deals 
primarily with the ATAA case, referred to the ECJ. Only aspects of relevance 
to the research question – the role of the Court in legitimizing and thus 
promoting climate action – will be studied. 
 
4.2 The Power of the Court 
A first observation concerns the status of the CJEU in relation to the Union 
as a whole. It is recognized as one of the most powerful high courts in the 
world, with a crucial impact on the European integration and EU policy 
making.
148
 While it is not a separate organization, but one of many EU 
institutions, it holds a high degree of autonomy and independence.
149
 This is 
also manifest from the, at times, divergent perspectives perceptible in its 
rulings, compared to that of the Member States: While the EU initially was, 
and still to a large extent is based on economic integration objectives, the 
Court has taken into account more nuanced values, such as the rule of law, 
the political sensitivity of matters and justice arguments. This attitude has 
also been accepted, even invited, by the Member States, and continue to 
influence both the internal and external politics of the Union.
150
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 Worth mentioning is that the CJEU alone is not responsible for this 
adjudication – it relies on a continuous judicial dialogue between the CJEU 
and the national courts of the Member States.
151
 
 
4.3 Jurisdiction to Interpret and Uphold EU Law 
The ATAA claims were brought within the ambit of a preliminary reference 
procedure on the validity of a Union act, the Aviation Directive.
152
 The role 
of the CJEU in such a procedure is to ensure that Union law is applied 
uniformly by national courts. As the Court so often has emphasized, 
“[d]ifferences between courts of the Member States as to the validity of acts 
of European Union law would be liable to jeopardize the very unity of the 
European Union legal order and to undermine the fundamental requirement 
of legal certainty.”153  
 Article 2 TEU states that the Union is founded on, inter alia, the rule 
of law. Furthermore, Article 19 TEU provides that the role of the CJEU is 
“to ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law 
is observed.” The CJEU is the authoritative interpreter of Union law and the 
only court that can declare a Union act as invalid.
154
 It is therefore essential 
that we take notice when the Court speaks on what EU law is – what the 
precise meaning of the Union’s environmental protection values is, how the 
relationship between EU law and the Union’s international obligations is to 
be understood, etc. In upholding the rule of law in the exercise of Union 
powers, the Court can be seen as legitimizing them. 
 The competence to interpret and invalidate Union legislation is subject 
to the limits of jurisdiction conferred on the Court by the Treaties. In 
exceptional cases it has interpreted its own jurisdiction extensively to 
exceed the literal scope of the Treaties, e.g. to ensure the coherence and 
autonomy of the EU legal order, or to avoid gaps in the system of legal 
protection.
155
 In this way, the Court engages actively in interpreting what 
role it has to play in the development of Union law. So also in the field of 
climate change policy making. 
4.4 Case Summary: C-366/10 
On 16 December 2009, three US-based but globally operating airlines – 
American Airlines, Continental Airlines and United Air Lines, together with 
Air Transport Association of America, a non-profit trade and service 
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association of airlines in the USA – brought claims against a British 
regulation
156
 transposing Directive 2008/101/EC.
157
 The defendant was the 
United Kingdom Minister for Energy and Climate Change as the national 
authority primarily responsible for the regulation.
158
  
 In short, the applicants challenged the validity of Directive 
2008/101/EC, alleging that the EU had exceeded its powers and violated 
several principles of customary international law by including, within its 
emissions trading scheme, those parts of international flights that take place 
over the high seas or over the territory of a third country.
159
  
 Moreover, the applicants alleged that the EU had infringed its 
obligations under the Kyoto Protocol
160
 by imposing the regulation 
unilaterally and not under the auspices of ICAO.
161
  
 Lastly, the applicants alleged that the emissions trading scheme 
amounts to a tax or charge prohibited by the principle of freedom of air 
transportation as laid down in the Chicago Convention
162
 and the Open 
Skies Agreement concluded between the Union and the United States.
163
 
 The High Court of Justice of England and Wales referred a number of 
questions for preliminary ruling to the CJEU. First, the submitting Court 
asked whether the international customary law principles or the international 
treaty provisions invoked were capable of being relied upon by individuals 
in order to challenge the validity of the Aviation Directive.
164
  
 Only certain of the provisions of the Open Skies Agreement were 
deemed unconditional and sufficiently precise so as to apply directly and 
immediately to airlines.
165
 Similarly, certain principles of customary 
international law
166
 were held as admissible, as they are capable of calling 
into question the regulatory competences of the Union.
167
 However, due to 
the lack of precision of customary international law, the judicial review on 
these points was limited to the question whether the EU institutions made 
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manifest errors of assessment when applying the principles.
168
 All other 
claims were dismissed due to lack of direct effect. 
 Proceeding to the merits of the case, the Court assessed the question 
whether the Directive was invalid based on the invokable international 
treaty or customary law provisions. 
 The CJEU concluded that the Aviation Directive neither infringes 
customary international law principles,
169
 nor does it infringe the Open 
Skies Agreement.
170
 The Court thus rejected all complaints, finding that 
none of the alleged grounds could affect the validity of Directive 
2008/101/EC. 
 
4.4.1 Legitimizing the EU as a Global Legislator 
When discussing the legitimizing role of the CJEU, the first question must 
naturally be what is there to legitimize? The need to legitimize, or justify a 
certain measure arise only when the right to act is not taken for granted. The 
challenge to the validity of the Aviation Directive evidently amounts to such 
questioning. In the case of the Directive, the judicial challenge was also 
accompanied with a wide amount of other forms of criticism.
171
  
 By including aviation in the EU ETS, the Union has unilaterally 
adopted internal measures with far-reaching international effects.
172
 The EU 
defined the geographical scope of its emission trading scheme to cover all 
parts of flights, within or outside EU territory. Fahey comments this tactic: 
 
The EU ETS aviation rules represent an effort by the EU to engage in 
rulemaking or standard setting, with effects upon actors and standards 
outside the EU. Rulemaking enhances the EU’s stance as an entity that 
could set exemplary goals with wide regulatory effects and extend 
both its legal and political reach beyond what would be possible 
through ordinary international legal instruments. The EU ETS rules 
enacted were thus EU rules with global ambitions.
173
 
 
Despite the clear external effects, the CJEU chose to interpret the Aviation 
Directive as a wholly internal regulation (as opposed to external 
environmental measures).
174
 Indirectly, the Court expands the Union’s 
competence to regulate air pollution beyond its external borders.
175
 In this 
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way the Court legitimized Union action and the Union’s self-assumed role 
as a global legislator on climate change issues. 
 This stance is however neither a novelty in the EU context, nor 
something exclusively European. Examples of unilaterally imposed 
legislative acts can be found, for instance, in US trade restrictions globally 
imposed on shrimp and tuna fishing to enforce compliance with American 
environmental protection standards, in US sanctions imposed on public and 
private actors violating US anti-trafficking legislation, whether these are 
nationals or foreign,
176
 or in the anti-corruption enforcement conducted 
under the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which has had a 
demonstrable impact on the worldwide behavior of foreign state-owned 
enterprises also acting in the USA.
177
  
 In the European context, the imposition of certain oil tanker standards 
on vessels visiting a port within the EU area, including foreign ones, to 
prevent oil leakages shows many similarities with the Aviation Directive.
178
 
And EU environmental legislation on topics such as the management of 
hazardous substances has had a manifest influence on Chinese, Japanese and 
South Korean environmental legislation, and has been directly incorporated 
into Californian law.
179
 Bradford here speaks of ‘the Brussels Effect’ and 
deems the EUETS likely to have a spreading effect, due to the European 
share of the aviation market and spread of corporate standards.180 
 To recapitulate, the ATAA judgment serves to legitimize EU’s 
unilateral action regulating Aviation carbon dioxide emissions. This is not a 
unique occasion in the Court’s history, but deserves some further 
elaboration. 
 
4.4.1.1 The Court’s reasoning 
The grounds given by the Court for justifying EU action refers mainly the 
Union’s territorial jurisdiction and to environmental protection grounds.181  
 First, the Court justifies the extended application of the Directive to 
parts of flights taking place outside Union territory on territorial grounds: 
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while the Directive is not intended to apply to international flights that 
merely fly over EU territory, it is perfectly warranted to apply to flights that 
have chosen to arrive at or depart from an aerodrome situated in a Member 
State. This “since those aircraft are physically in the territory of one of the 
Member States of the European Union and are thus subject on that basis to 
the unlimited jurisdiction of the European Union.”182  
 This despite the fact that the Aviation Directive is in fact designed to 
promote its incorporated values outside the Union territory. For instance, it 
provides for the exemption of airlines landing in the EU, provided that these 
are subject to “measures which have an environmental effect at least 
equivalent to that of this Directive”.183 The EU preserves to itself the 
exclusive power to determine which third country measures that would 
qualify as such an ‘equivalent measure’.184  
 The extraterritorial ambitions are somewhat toned down the opinion 
of Advocate General Kokott. Here the fact that the EU measures are not to 
be seen as a substitute to the existing international climate change regime 
are emphasized.
185
 Furthermore, as Bogojević highlights, the AG 
distinguishes between internal rules with extraterritorial effects and 
unilateral action, referring the Aviation Directive to the former category, as 
it does not lay down any concrete rules steering the conduct of third country 
airlines – it merely gives incentives to reduce emissions.186 
 At the same time, and despite the internal framing of the issue, the 
aims of promoting European standards and values globally is given a 
prominent position in the Courts justification.
187
 The fact that the emission 
allowances are calculated on the basis of the whole flight, including parts 
performed over third state territory, is justified with a view to the 
environmental protection objectives of the Union: 
 
as European Union policy on the environment seeks to ensure a high 
level of protection in accordance with Article 191(2) TFEU, the 
European Union legislature may in principle choose to permit a 
commercial activity, in this instance air transport, to be carried out in 
the territory of the European Union only on condition that operators 
comply with the criteria that have been established by the European 
Union and are designed to fulfil the environmental protection 
objectives which it has set for itself…188 
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Bogojević argues that this expresses a view that the Union’s international 
obligations and the global institutional failure may justify legislative 
measures, even in the absence of an international legal framework for 
aviation emissions. The Court thus legitimizes the use of the commercial 
measures in question – the ETS – as a means to secure compliance to Union 
standards: 
 
It shows that the EU’s environmental competences can be used to set 
conditions for commercial activity in the EU. This is a powerful 
message, as it positions environmental protection at the forefront of 
economic activities in the EU.
189
  
 
By legitimizing internal regulations the Court sanctions the regulatory 
pathway chosen by the Union, which, as opposed to international 
negotiations, are enforceable against the Member States. Already existing 
regulations may also be complemented by new once, through a speedier 
procedure than more protracted international decision-making. 
 
4.4.2 Justiciability of Climate Action in the EU 
Climate change litigation is characterized by the intertwining of politics 
with legal issues, and, as noted above, the intertwining of internal and 
external politics.  
 Under the preceding section, the legitimizing role of the Court has 
been discussed. Hereunder one aspect of this function will be analyzed – 
namely the Court’s role as a safeguard of the Union legal order. This section 
argues that the ATAA case can be seen as an affirmation of a longer 
development where the Court takes on a duty to protect certain fundamental 
values enshrined in the founding Treaties –cementing its own role as an 
interpreter of EU law. As stated above, the role of courts will, inter alia, be 
defined by the scope of its judicial review. An important aspect of this, 
notably in the context of climate change, is the limits imposed on the 
judicial review by political questions. Under Chapter 3.3.3 the political 
question doctrine was discussed in relation to the US Supreme Court cases. 
Considering the prominent role given to this feature in US climate related 
litigation, the way in which the CJEU handles the legal-political tension 
warrants some analysis.  
 In ATAA, the CJEU remains silent on the legal-political tension 
associated with the case. This stance may seem controversial seen to the 
strong political implications of the case, but perhaps less so looking at the 
development in recent case law. 
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 To begin with, a clarification of what is political about the ATAA case 
is of relevance. Apart from the generally highly politicized nature of climate 
change policy, the ATAA case and the Aviation Directive featured strong, 
opposing economic and political interests: on the one hand a robust lobby 
industry favoring voluntary market solutions, on the other, the parties 
defending public interventions in order to safeguard environmental interests 
deemed worthy of protection. There were trade policy implications, 
economic concerns in times of recession, transport politics etc. involved. 
The EU Emissions Trading Scheme and Directive 2008/101 ultimately 
concerns problems of allocating responsibility and the costs of pollution. In 
essence the litigation concerned the relationship between two intersecting 
legal orders – that of the EU and of international law. Furthermore, the 
reactions triggered by the Commission proposal to regulate CO2 emissions 
from aviation
190
 provoked heavy counter-lobbying on the part of the airline 
industry. A coalition of states including the USA, Australia, China, Japan 
and South Korea petitioned the EU to exclude non-European aircraft from 
the scope of application.
191
 The US House of Representatives also passed 
the EU ETS Prohibition Act of 2011, prohibiting US airlines from 
complying with the EU regulation.
192
 Following the judgment the China Air 
Transport Association has threatened the EU to engage in trade war counter-
measures if the EU punishes its airlines for the non-compliance.
193
  
 These are but some examples of many similar steps taken by third 
countries in reaction to the Aviation Directive. A fair conclusion is that the 
EU ETS, the Aviation Directive and the ATAA case do have strong political 
implications, not least in relation to the Union’s external relations.  
 As stated above, the Court reviewed the validity of the Aviation 
Directive without commenting on its own jurisdiction, the contra measures 
brought by for instance the US legislature, or on the global ambitions of the 
EU. This silence is not all self-explanatory. For instance, Fahey describes 
the omission of the Court to pronounce upon its own jurisdiction as a 
remarkable failure to “engage in a more explicit dialogue with the EU 
                                                 
190
 COM(2006)0818 FIN Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to include aviation 
activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the 
Community, adopted 20/12/2006. 
191
 Corporate Europe Observatory . 2008. “Climate Crash in Strasbourg: An Industry in 
Denial, How the aviation industry undermined the inclusion of aviation in the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme.” Accessible at 
<http://archive.corporateeurope.org/docs/climatecrash.pdf>, accessed 8 April 2013. 
192
 H.R. 2492 European Union Emissions Trading Scheme Prohibition Act of 2011 
193
 Leung, Alison, Kotoky, Anurag. 2012. “China ready to impound EU planes in CO2 
dispute.” Reuters, 12 June 2012. 
 40 
legislature”194 and as a missed opportunity “to explicitly consider its own 
contribution to the promotion of global standards.“195  
 A comparison to case law touching on the same issue may provide for 
some guidance on how the Court perceives its own role.  
 
 
4.4.2.1 To what extent can the Court judge on 
politically delicate questions? 
 
Is there something similar to a political question doctrine in the EU? While 
the full picture is complex and no clear-cut guidelines have been given by 
the Court, the overall conclusion is that no such doctrine limiting the scope 
of judicial review exists.
196
 In a number of cases relating to the legality of 
sanctions introduced by the EU, or a Member State implementing EU law, 
as a result of EU’s international obligations, the limits of judicial review has 
been deduced by the CJEU. 
 In the Sanctions case
197
 on the legality of Greek trade sanctions 
against the FYROM, something similar to a political question doctrine was 
upheld by the Court. Advocate General Jacobs suggested in his opinion that 
“the scope and intensity of the review that can be exercised by the Court is 
severely limited on account of the [political] nature of the issues raised”198 
and further on that “there are simply no juridical tools of analysis for 
approaching such problems”199 
 This reflects a rather narrow view on court jurisdiction, creating a 
need to distinguish between questions of a more political nature (such as the 
appropriateness of a Member State unilaterally obstructing EU commercial 
policy in order to maintain peace and security) – outside the Court’s 
competence, and purely legal issues (e.g. rules governing the procedure) – 
where the Court may carry out a full judicial review.
200
 
 A similar line of reasoning was upheld in the OMPI ruling, where the 
Court of First Instance (CFI) ruled on the legality of the Council Decision to 
freeze the funds of the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran.201 
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 Nevertheless, other cases point in the opposite direction, widening the 
scope of judicial review. The Werner,
202
 Bosporus,203 Centro-Com204 and the 
Kadi205 cases all represent an expansion of the Court’s jurisdiction to review 
issues verging on political decisions.
206
 In the Bosporus case, the Court did 
not hold the political objective of the sanctions in question as an obstacle to 
review the legality of the measure, contrary to the Sanctions case and the 
OMPI ruling.
207
 And in Centro-Com, the Court found the necessary 
prerequisites for a full judicial review in the fact that the measures 
concerned were adopted within a policy field where relevant EU legislation 
already existed.
208
 
 In the Kadi and Al Barakaat cases, the CFI and the ECJ came to 
strikingly different conclusions on the matter. This case is of interest as the 
Court very explicitly articulates its views on the legal-political issue. Like 
many of the cases cited above, Kadi concerned the relationship between the 
EU legal order and the UN legal order and the legality of EU measures 
implementing UN Security Council resolutions. The CFI had dismissed the 
claims on the grounds that the UNSC resolution takes precedence over EU 
law, and a review of the EU regulation would imply an indirect review of 
the lawfulness of the UNSC resolutions.
209
 The ECJ set aside the CFI ruling 
and rejected the inadmissibility claim. The opinion presented by Advocate 
General Maduro gives a valuable insight in the reasoning on Court’s 
jurisdiction: 
 
It is true that courts ought not to be institutionally blind. Thus, the 
Court should be mindful of the international context in which it 
operates and conscious of its limitations. It should be aware of the 
impact its rulings may have outside the confines of the Community. In 
an increasingly interdependent world, different legal orders will have 
to endeavour to accommodate each other’s jurisdictional claims. As a 
result, the Court cannot always assert a monopoly on determining 
how certain fundamental interests ought to be reconciled. […] 
However, the Court cannot, in deference to the views of those 
institutions, turn its back on the fundamental values that lie at the 
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basis of the Community legal order and which it has the duty to 
protect.
210
  
 
This shows the balance of interest the Court must carry out when judging 
upon issues clearly affecting EU external relations: on the one hand, the 
necessity to take into consideration that the Union is not an island but a part 
of a bigger world, and on the other, the duty to protect the fundamental 
values of the Community legal order.  
 The view presented by the AG is that the Court, “rather than 
trespassing into the domain of politics […] is reaffirming the limits that the 
law imposes on certain political decisions.”211 Thus, instead of elevating the 
concerns surrounding a legal review of a political decision (e.g. democratic 
accountability, legitimacy etc.), the Opinion focuses on the vulnerability of 
political process, necessitating court intervention.
212
 
 The ECJ judgment confirmed the Opinion, upholding the Court’s 
jurisdiction to check the validity of EU measures in the light of the 
fundamental rights that form an integral part of the general principles of 
Community law. These constitute a condition for lawfulness of EC acts 
which cannot be precluded by an international agreement.213  
 It can consequently be concluded that no political question doctrine 
limits the scope of the CJEU’s judicial review.  
  
4.4.2.2 Conclusion applied to the ATAA case 
 
A distinction between the foregoing cases and ATAA should be made. While 
the first category concerned the possibility to neglect positive international 
obligations, in order to uphold EU values, the situation is the reverse in 
ATAA. Here the possibility of taking EU measures against the Union’s 
international obligations, possibly violating a negative obligation not to act 
was in question.  
 The Kadi case can be seen as endorsing an order where the scope of 
judicial review can be established by looking at EU constitutional 
principles.
214
 Fundamental rights evidently form a part of this. The question 
is whether environmental concerns also do. The conclusion that political 
question do not necessarily limit the scope of judicial review seems to be 
confirmed in ATAA, as the Court itself raises no such concerns. What is 
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important is that this case elevates environmental protection values to the 
same level in the norm hierarchy as has previously been given to 
fundamental rights – namely as allowing for derogation from the Union’s 
international obligations. 
 There is little doubt that the EU itself is a powerful actor in global 
environmental governance. But what about the European Court of Justice? 
The ATAA case shows that there are reasons to follow the actions of the 
CJEU more closely. Taking on the ‘duty to protect’ certain fundamental 
values, even in situations where the judicial review will have clear political 
effects, the Court will have an important role to play in the promotion of EU 
values outside the Union’s external borders.  
  
 44 
5 Concluding Analysis 
The lead question of this thesis has been what role the judiciary plays in 
legitimizing and thus encouraging climate change action. This question 
must be answered by looking at case law in the light of the contexts in 
which they arise. The scope and purpose of the judicial review, the legal 
instruments available and opted for and the features of the legal-political 
system are elements that will impact on the role of courts.  
 Due to the different points of departure, the results of these cases are 
not fully comparable. While the applicants in the US Supreme Court cases 
resorted to the judiciary in order to provide concrete action in a situation 
where they view government regulation as inadequate, or even non-existent, 
the applicants in the CJEU case opposed climate change regulations already 
adopted. However, the findings of the comparison reveal both interesting 
similarities and divergences in the Courts’ approaches to climate change 
action. 
 Among the many different roles played by the judiciary, this thesis has 
focused on the role of identifying and legitimizing a specific actor or a 
means of action. This is of particular importance in the context of climate 
change. This can be exemplified by the regulatory road to action under the 
auspices of EPA in the US Supreme Court cases, and by the EU’s regional 
decision-making legitimized in ATAA.  
 The economic costs of climate change are often described as the ‘cost 
of inaction’ due to its adverse impacts on the human and natural 
environment.
215
 The role of judiciary in this is not just to resolve disputes 
between individual parties – it is focused on a societal interest. In the light 
of an institutional failure to take action (on an international level in the case 
of ATAA, and on the national level in the case of Massachusetts and AEP) 
the judiciary can be seen as the launcher of a movement towards regulatory 
action. 
 As has been discussed, some basic features of the polity system of the 
EU and the US respectively create the necessary preconditions for the 
judiciary to hold this action encouraging function. Of importance is notably 
the system of separation of powers characteristic of a federal state or 
supranational entity, creating a demand for courts to fill the gap of the legal 
lacunas or ambiguities resulting from the political decision making process. 
The courts function as a rallying point, connecting different areas of law and 
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different actors and parties, rescaling them across time and space – thus 
removing some of the ‘transaction costs’ of climate change action. 
 Another element of significance is the view on court interventions in 
the political process. There are two aspects to this: first, how the role of the 
court is perceived by society, and second, how it is perceived by the court 
itself.  
 In reference to the first aspect, both the US Supreme Court and the 
European Court of justice are perceived as very powerful entities. They have 
considerably marked the evolution of various policy fields in the US and the 
EU respectively. They share a history of adjudication of crucial issues 
relating to the governance of their respective societies. What is very 
important is that the interventions of both Courts traditionally have been 
respected. Even in situations where criticism and public debate have 
followed on controversial judgments, they are characterized by a high 
degree of compliance by the political branches. However, a careful 
balancing act is often undertaken by the Courts, which must be particular 
about not encroaching too far into the domain of the legislative or executive 
branches.  
 The second aspect will be discussed below (5.2). 
 
5.1 Purpose and Impact of the Judicial Review 
The US and the EU cases were brought with different purposes in view. The 
preliminary reference on validity against the EU act aimed at reinforcing a 
‘world order’ where Union climate change action is subordinate to the 
developments at international level, and where the EU freedom of 
movement is limited by international law. Its primary focus was thus 
contrary to the case of Massachusetts and AEP, which aimed at mobilizing 
climate change action. However, all three cases concerned in essence the 
question of which entity that may take legitimate climate change action.  
 In Massachusetts the applicants sought to mobilize a pathway for 
climate change action which they – quite rightly – conceived as provided for 
by legislation, but which remained inactivated, or blocked, by EPA’s refusal 
to regulate carbon dioxide emissions. Also in AEP the applicants sought to 
mobilize concrete action through a legal instrument alternative to the 
legislative process, i.e. the common law public nuisance cause of action. 
 The comparison shows that neither the CJEU nor the US Supreme 
Court is particularly concerned with the impacts of climate change, but more 
with general principles guiding legal proceedings (e.g. the political question 
doctrine, displacement, the principle of direct effect and principles of 
institutional balance). Both Courts are general courts and not specialized 
environmental courts, perhaps unwilling to assess questions of a more 
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discretionary nature. This naturally goes in line with the assumption that the 
judiciary merely interprets the law, and that it is up to the legislator to 
correct an unwarranted result of this interpretation. 
 This does not mean that the role of courts should be neglected – it 
must be taken into account when setting up the legal framework for climate 
change. The Court’s interpretation will demonstrate the concrete application 
of the law, including its deficits and shortcomings.  
 Furthermore, as already indicated, neither the Supreme Court nor the 
CJEU has refrained from using the ‘gaps’ of the law to uphold important 
social values. What the CJEU does in ATAA is to ‘upgrade’ environmental 
protection objectives to a level in the norm hierarchy at least equal to that of 
the Union’s international obligations. By this legitimization, the Court paves 
the way for environmental values. This might be a reflection of a public 
perception more positive towards environmental protection, but it will also 
enforce such an attitude – of crucial importance to the prospect of 
environmental governance. 
 The outcome of the judicial reviews is very different in the two 
Courts: while the CJEU judgment serves to legitimize climate change action 
(already taken), the effects of the US Supreme Court judgment is more 
uncertain. The Supreme Court enables EPA regulations on carbon dioxide 
emissions, but does clearly not oblige the agency to do so. In addition, the 
AEP judgment may remove some of the incitements of the agency to 
undertake regulations, as the possibilities to review a continued negligence 
are restricted through the judgment. As the Court clarified that even if EPA 
takes no action, opponents of such a decision has nowhere to turn but to the 
civil judicial review. Whether such a statutory-based claim for action will 
prove successful depends on the limits to the discretion left with the agency. 
And which reasons for inaction that would amount to being ‘arbitrary, 
capriccious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law’ remains uncertain.216 
 In a comparison, both the CJEU and the US Supreme Court contribute 
to enabling and legitimizing climate change action. However, in both cases 
the definite impacts of the litigations remain yet to be seen.  
 
5.2 The Courts’ Justifications 
How did the Courts justify the choice to legitimize a specific actor? In 
Massachusetts, the Court’s mandating of EPA merely extends to a textual 
interpretation of the underlying statute and the scientific assessment that 
carbon dioxide indeed qualifies as an ‘air pollutant’ in the wording of the 
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CAA. In the subsequent AEP case the justifications given by the Supreme 
Court are somewhat more evasive. On the one hand, the reference to the 
precedent set in Massachusetts and the fact that EPA has taken some action 
in response to the finding does not necessarily amount to a robust 
justification of why common law should not contribute to climate change 
action. On the other hand, the Court clarifies its reasoning when it expounds 
on the appropriateness of an ‘expert agency’ rather than ‘individual district 
judges’ serving as the ‘primary regulator’. The Court here prefers to act in 
favor of the responsible public authority, restricting its own scope of review.  
 The Supreme Court’s perception of itself could also be elucidated by 
the now famous quote uttered by Justice Scalia in the oral argument before 
Massachusetts: “I’m not a scientist. That’s why I don’t want to deal with 
global warming, to tell you the truth.”217 Again this underlines how the 
Court prefers to leave a broad margin of appreciation to the administrative 
agency appointed by the legislator to take decisive climate action. 
 In legitimizing the EU as a global legislator, the European Court of 
Justice departs from a similar point of view. As action is already taken, it is 
treated as the norm, a fait accompli, the criticism to this order of things 
ignored. This implies that it is the challenges to the EU measures that must 
be legitimate and justified, not the other way around. Consequently, the 
majority of the applicants’ arguments are dismissed on grounds of lack of 
direct effect, and only the claims that are assessed on their merits give 
reason to justify the Union action. 
 
5.3 The Courts’ Views on their Role in Climate 
Action 
The second aspect of the view on court interventions is that of the Courts’ 
own perception of what role they ought to play. How can this be deduced 
from the analyzed cases? In the US context, the limits to the scope of 
judicial review set by the political questions was discussed by the dissenting 
Justices in Massachusetts and by the lower instances in AEP. However in 
none of those cases did the majority of the Supreme Court comment on the 
issue. On the one hand, this can be seen as an opening for environmentalists, 
and a confirmation of a development towards the demise of the doctrine, 
similar to that in the EU. On the other hand, through its displacement 
finding in AEP, the Supreme Court manifestly restricts the possibility of 
court-made common law in favor of administrative regulations. 
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 In AEP the Second Circuit saw a possibility to accommodate both the 
EPA mandate and the Court’s common law jurisdiction. The Supreme 
Court’s however did not, and chose to block this means of action. 
 One must remember that these two means of action serves different 
purposes. Federal public nuisance law not only provides for a possibility for 
cost-allocation of climate-related harm, but also represents an important 
means to petitioning the government to take action, including regulatory 
such. It is a means for individuals and ‘weaker’ stakeholders, while 
regulations often are the result of strong industry lobbyists.  
 Therefore, the AEP judgment might have negative effects both from 
an environmental justice perspective, and for the prospect of mobilizing 
climate action. The Court’s classification of public nuisance litigation as a 
“parallel track” thus appears as generalizing and somewhat oblivious to the 
complexities concerning climate change governance.  
 Similarly, in ATAA, the CJEU never commented on the potential 
criticism to a judicial review seen to the political aspects involved in the 
case. This stance seems to go in line with earlier case law of the Court. 
Some interesting remarks can be made in relation to this ‘silence’ when 
legitimizing the EU as a global policy maker. After the ATAA judgment was 
handed down, the EU has “stopped the clock”218 – temporarily suspending 
the Directive’s application to parts of flights taking place outside the EU 
ETS territory.
219
 The commission explains this with the fact that the Union 
seeks to settle a global agreement at ICAO level. Why this change of 
approach comes after the Court’s finding, clearly justifying the action, can 
of course be discussed. It does however point to the fact that the subject 
matter of the case was, and still is political to such an extent that a comment 
on this legal-political tension would have been warranted on the part of the 
CJEU. In line with the more evasive reasoning in for instance the Kadi 
cases, the Court could have commented on its own role.  
 One could argue that an explicit discussion on the adjudication of 
climate change action is even more warranted: while Kadi and similar cases 
concerned the question whether the EU ought to take a certain action or not, 
ATAA concerned the right of the world to comply with EU regulations. In 
other words, the CJEU judgment – demanding action on the part of third 
countries (which did not have any say in the adoption of the Directive) and 
not just the Union itself – will have a very broad reach. There are many 
                                                 
218
 European Commission, Climate Action, 'Stopping the clock' to allow more time for a 
global solution, accessible at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/aviation/index_en.htm>, accessed 20 May 
2013, last updated 17 May 2013 
219
 Decision No 377/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 
2013 derogating temporarily from Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a scheme for 
greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community Text with EEA 
relevance, OJ L 113, 25.4.2013, p. 1–4 
 49 
airlines that are to comply. A high rate of non-compliance and extensive 
criticism risk undermining the Court’s own legitimacy outside the Union. 
Judicial activism only works when the world is ready and willing to comply.  
 All in all, what the three cases show is the importance of having 
credible enforcement mechanisms upholding compliance to national and 
international environmental commitments. 
  
5.4 Final Remarks 
Among the numerous uncertainties that surround the future governance of 
climate change, one certainty is that something must be done. Precisely 
therefore, sooner or later something will most likely happen.
220
 How this 
transformation will be manifested remains uncertain. An important role for 
the judiciary might be to shape it in a certain direction. Expressed 
differently, the judiciary, just like the legislature and the executive branches 
of governments, will ultimately be obliged to play an increasingly active 
role, as the impacts of climate change will have more and more perceptible 
impact on states, corporations and individuals. 
 After decades of policy debate, climate change governance still 
struggles with the very fundamental query of where to take decisive action. 
Who – that is which country, which global forum, which national institution 
– should act? It is not up to the judiciary to measure the costs of action 
against the costs of inaction – this is a political decision. But by forcing any 
climate change action, courts compel the legislator to swallow the bitter pill. 
To undertake the calculus. Thereby the courts serve to break a political 
deadlock. 
 The high Courts of the US and the EU are both the authoritative 
interpreters of ‘the law’ of their respective legal systems. The power of 
these Courts and their deeply rooted traditions of intervening into society in 
order to uphold the law and safeguard fundamental societal interests create 
the basis for an important role to play in the legitimization and mobilization 
of climate change action.  
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